Introduction
Collateral is a common term in loan contracts, together with the interest rate, maturity, size and possible covenants. Credit market research explains the use of collateral as a consequence of problems of adverse selection [Besanko and Thakor (1987a and b) , Chan and Kanakas (1985) , and Bester (1985) ], and/or problems of moral hazard [Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) ], which are present in transactions between borrowers and lenders. The nature of the relationship between borrowers and lenders, transactional or relationship lending [Sharpe (1990) , and Boot and Thakor (1994) ], the level of competition in the credit market [Besanko and Thakor (1987a) ] and the cost/benefits of a thorough screening of borrowers [Manove and Padilla (1999 and 2001) ] may also explain why some loans are secured and others are granted without collateral. Besides these theoretical developments, there is a belief that academic research about the role of collateral is limited [John, Lynch, and Puri (2003)] while the empirical literature has not yet settled important issues such as whether collateral is a signal of a riskier or a safer loan, and whether relationship lending lowers or increases the requirements for obtaining a loan. Theories that relate the use of collateral to credit market competition and with the inclinations of lenders to ask for collateral instead of thoroughly screening the borrower have not yet been subject to empirical tests. Nothing is known either on how macroeconomic conditions (the business cycle and the risk-free interest rate of the economy) affect the use of collateral in business loans.
Drawing from existing theories, this paper models the use of collateral to secure a loan as a function of characteristics of the borrower (credit quality), the lender (specialisation), the credit market (competition), the nature of the borrower-lender relationship (duration), the loan (size) and of macroeconomic conditions (business cycle) and in all cases with cross sectional data.
Besides the extension of empirical work to other determinants of the use of collateral not considered before, such as credit market competition [Besanko and Thakor (1987a) ], the inclination of lenders to use collateral as a substitute of thorough screening of the borrower [Manove and Padilla (1999 and 2001) ] and macroeconomic conditions, the paper provides a new and sharper test of the relationship between use of collateral and credit risk of the borrower.
The unique database, the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain, allows us to group borrowers in three risk classes according to their public record in that Credit Register: those that have had a loan in default at the time they get a new one, those that had never defaulted at the time of the new loan is granted but default in the near future, and, finally, those that do not default at all. This grouping of borrowers provides the appropriate set up to test the theories that link the use of collateral to credit risk of the borrower and information conditions in the credit market. The group that has a public record of past defaults is the group of 1. What follows focuses only on external collateral, i.e. the assets pledged to secure the loan which are external to the firm. The reason for this choice is that casual observation of the database suggests that this is the most frequent form of collateral. But the precise nature of the collateral is not known and the possibility that collateral is, in some cases, internal (the assets pledged as collateral are internal to the firm) can not be totally ruled out. The use of internal collateral has been considered useful in solving asset-substitution problems, Smith and Warner (1979) , and in solving Mayers's under-investment problem, Stulz and Johnson (1985) . John, Lynch and Puri (2003) show that moral hazard problems affect yields of loans secured with internal collateral.
observed lower credit quality and the theory predicts that their likelihood of pledging collateral is the highest among all borrowers [Berger and Udell (1990) , and Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) ]. Those borrowers with a clean record of defaults when they get a loan but default afterwards can still belong to the borrowers of observed credit quality if lenders have other information such as accounting data or credit ratings to sort them out. If this is the case the likelihood to pledge collateral among borrowers with first default after their current loan will also be higher than among borrowers of no default at all because lenders ask collateral to borrowers of observed lower quality.
But if credit quality is private information, borrowers with a clean record of defaults that consider themselves of high credit quality can use collateral to signal quality and get a lower interest in their loans [Bester (1985) , Besanko and Thakor (1987a and b) , Chan and Kanatas (1985) , and Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1986) ]. If borrowers with a clean record of defaults behave this way among those borrowers that default for the first time after getting the loan, revealing themselves as low quality, the proportion of loans with collateral will be lower than among those that do not default. Therefore if collateral is used to signal credit quality, as theories that explain the use of collateral to solve adverse selection problems predict, then the likelihood of collateral in loans to those that default after the current loan for the first time will be lower than among borrowers with no defaults.
We find that the likelihood of collateral is higher among borrowers of the first and of the second group (borrowers that had defaulted before they get a new loan and borrowers that default for the first time after getting the loan) than among borrowers that never default.
This would confirm that the observed risk situation prevails in decisions about the terms of the loans. But we also find that the likelihood of collateral among borrowers who first default after the loan is granted, compared with the likelihood of collateral among borrowers that do not default, is higher in the population of old borrowers, with past loans, than in the population of new ones, those that get a loan for the first time. As it can be expected the lender opportunities to observe the risk of the borrower are higher for older borrowers, and the possibility to use collateral to signal credit quality occurs mainly among young borrowers with no previous record of financial or commercial activity. We interpret the lower likelihood of collateral in loans to new borrowers that default after the loan is granted compared with the likelihood of collateral in loans to old borrowers that default for the first time after the current loan, as evidence that some loans are made under conditions of observed risk and others under conditions of private information, although overall the former prevails over the later.
Other papers have looked at the relation between collateral and risk. In some of them risk is measured by the risk premium in the interest rate of the loan [Berger and Udell (1990) , and Degrese and van Cayseele (2000) ]. The evidence is mixed since the first paper finds a positive association between collateral and risk premium, while the second a negative one.
But, most important, the risk premium in the interest rate can be a measure of the risk of the project to be financed with the loan, while the theory links the use of collateral to the risk of the borrower, not to the risk of the project. Harhoff and Korting (1999) find a positive association between use of collateral and observed (i.e. past) low credit quality of the borrower, but they do not consider future loan behaviour (i.e. future defaults). Finally, Jimenez
and Saurina (2004), with the same database used in this paper but with the stock of loans not with the new loans in each period, find that the presence of collateral increases the likelihood that a loan will be in default, but no distinction is made as a function of the age of the borrower.
Section 2 describes the empirical model on the determinants of collateral usage in loans and lays down the main hypothesis to be tested, based upon the theoretical models and previous empirical research. In Section 3 we describe the database, the variables and the methodology followed to test the main hypotheses. The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 contains the discussion of the main empirical findings.
The conclusions summarise the paper and highlight its contributions.
2 Literature review on the use of collateral in loan contracts and main hypotheses of the paper
As indicated, theories of collateral refer to information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, to benefits and costs of relationship lending, to the competitive conditions in the credit market, to the inclination of lenders to substitute collateral in place of a thorough screening of the borrower to secure the loan, and to characteristics of the loan, in order to explain why some loans use collateral and others don't. This section reviews these theories of the determinants of collateral and formulates empirically testable predictions from them, together with extensions to control variables that have interest in their own although no precise theory exists on how they determine the use of collateral. The predictions will be formulated in terms of the observable variables used to evaluate the credit quality of borrowers, the intensity of relationship lending, competition in the credit market, characteristics of lenders and variables used to control for borrowers' unobserved and time varying effects. The list of the variables, their definition and computation is shown in Table 1 .
Hypothesis 1. The likelihood of collateral in loans is higher among borrowers of observed lower credit quality Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) show that when lenders can observe the credit quality of the borrowers then low quality borrowers get a loan with collateral and good quality borrowers get loans without collateral. This implies that the likelihood of collateral in loans made to borrowers whose low credit quality is public knowledge, those assigned a value of 1 in the variable DEFAULTt-1, will be higher than in loans made to borrowers with a clean record of defaults.
Hypothesis 2. Among borrowers of unobserved credit quality (private information) the likelihood of collateral is higher among borrowers of higher credit quality.
This hypothesis is based on the theories that explain the use of collateral to signal good quality by borrowers in situations of adverse selection where borrowers know their credit quality but lenders don't [ (Chan and Kanatas (1985) , Bester (1985) , and Besanko and Thakor (1987a) ]. The empirical test of this prediction requires having some information on ex post observed credit quality of the borrowers. We use the variable DEFAULTt+1, that takes the value of 1 if a borrower has a clean record until t but defaults in t+1 and 0 otherwise, to identify those borrowers with clean record of defaults when they get a loan but default a year after. If good borrowers use collateral to signal credit quality in t, a negative sign for the coefficient of DEFAULTt+1 is expected since the theory predicts that low quality borrowers are less likely to pledge collateral than high quality ones. The problem with this test is that we do not know if borrowers that default in t+1 for the first time belong to the group of observed risk or to the group of private information. Most likely there will be a mix of the two situations and the sign of the coefficient of DEFAULTt+1 will depend on which proportion of cases dominates over the other.
The AGE AS BORROWERt-1 is a variable that can help to identify borrowers with different possibilities of being sorted by observed risk or by private information. Young borrowers start with scant information in their commercial and financial records but as time goes experiences accumulate and their records are filled with more information that can be used to calibrate their credit quality. Therefore, the proportion of borrowers that sort themselves as good quality pledging collateral is likely to be higher among young borrowers than among older ones. As borrowers get older the likelihood of being sorted from observed risk increases and therefore the proportion of borrowers sorted by observed risk in t in the group that default in t+1 should increase with age of the borrower.
The population of borrowers is divided into the group of "old borrowers", those that have had at least a previous loan before the current loan they get in t, and "new borrowers", those borrowers for whom the loan in t is the first one. The theory that explains collateral as a solution to adverse selection problems predicts a lower increase in collateral for those that default in t+1 among new borrowers than among old borrowers, if the proportion of loans made under private information is larger in the former than in the later.
Another variable that may help to sort cases where the dominant situation is observed risk from others where the dominant situation is private information, is the maturity of the loan. In long term loans the information advantage of the borrower over the lender is expected to be higher than in short term loans since the lender will be less forward looking than the borrower who will use the loan to finance a long term project. In our empirical analysis loans are grouped in short term and in long term loans and we expect that the results from private information over observed risk will be more relevant in the group of long term loans than in the group of short term loans.
Hypothesis 3. a) The likelihood of collateral decreases with the duration of the relationship between borrower and lender if the benefits of "relationship lending" prevail and increases with it if duration derives into a "hold up" situation. b) The use of collateral decreases with duration only for borrowers whose credit quality is not known at the time the loan is made.
This hypothesis resumes the predictions on the likelihood of collateral from the literature of relationship lending [Boot (2000) ]. Boot and Thakor (1994) show that repeated interactions between borrowers and lenders help to build trust and to reduce moral hazard problems. The use of collateral will be less likely as duration increases since collateral is an alternative to trust to solve moral hazard problems [Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) ]. In addition Berger and Udell (1995) argue that duration permits investment in information to better sort borrowers of different quality and that the reduction in the likelihood of collateral as duration increases can also be attributed to this sorting effect hazard then longer duration will lower the likelihood of collateral even among low quality borrowers and hypothesis 3b will be rejected.
Since duration of the relationship of the borrower with a particular bank will be jointly determined with the number of operations a borrower has with the bank and with the number of banks the borrower is working with, in the paper we test the hypothesis on the variable DURATIONt-1 controlling for these two variables, SCOPEt-1 and NUMBER OF LENDERSt-1, between the type of lender and the collateral decision has not been studied in detail.
3. The scope of the relationship between borrower and lender and the number of lenders can also be considered variables that characterise relationship lending. In principle, more loans with the same bank implies more relationship and more opportunities to strength the relationship and to improve knowledge. As the number of banks a borrower works with increases it means that the relationship between each of them will be weaker. From these arguments we would expect a negative coefficient for SCOPE and a positive coefficient for NUMBER OF LENDERS if benefits of relationship lending are higher than costs. But these two variables can be related to other unobserved characteristics of the borrower, for example credit quality [Petersen and Rajan (1994] or availability of assets to be used as collateral [Farinha and Santos (2002) ], so the specific predictions on them would require a more thorough analysis that it is out of the scope of the paper. Their inclusion in the model is mainly justified in terms of having additional control variables. Therefore, the probability of collateral in a loan should be higher among savings banks than among commercial banks.
Hypothesis 6. The amount of collateral in a loan will increase with the risk free interest rate of the economy and will decrease with the size of the loan.
This hypothesis is about the amount of collateral, once the decision to pledge collateral is already made. Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) show that, under moral hazard, once the lender chooses to ask for collateral, the amount of collateral will increase with the real interest rate of the economy, and decrease with the size of the loan and with a reduction in the dissipative cost of the collateral. To increase the amount of collateral instead of translating the increase in the risk-free real interest rate into higher interest on the loan reduces the agency costs of the transaction. Loans of a greater size reduce the amount of collateral because they imply a higher pay-off for the lender in the good states of the world. 
where i refers to the loan, j refers to the bank, k refers to the market, l refers to firm (borrower)
, t refers to the time period (year) and F(.) is a distribution function. From the theoretical analysis a positive sign is predicted for a1, hypothesis 1, while the sign of a2 is undetermined although in any case lower among new borrowers and long term loans than among old borrowers and short term loans, respectively (hypothesis 2). The sign of a3 is positive if relationship lending evolves into trust and better sorting of borrowers and negative if it evolves into a hold up situation (hypothesis 3a). The sign of a4 is expected non positive with absolute value greater or equal to a3 if duration just means better sorting possibilities and absolute value less than a4 if duration implies also more trust in the relationship (hypothesis 3b). We expect a7 negative, hypothesis 4a, and the sign of a8 will determine if competition in the credit market lowers (positive sign) or increases (negative sign) the incentives to invest in information (hypothesis 4b). A negative sign is predicted for a9, a10 and a 11, hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 6 will be tested with a model that explains the likelihood of collateral for three values of the dependent variable, no collateral, partial collateral, more than 50% of the face value of the loan, and full collateral, 100% face value of the loan. The predictions from the theory will be limited to two variables, the risk free interest rate of the economy and the size of the loan. Higher interest rates are expected to increase more the likelihood of total collateral than of partial collateral, while an increase in the size of the loan is expected to increase more the likelihood of partial collateral than of total collateral.
3
Database and methodology
Database
The database used in this paper is the Credit Register (Central de Información de Riesgos, CIR of the Banco de España). We focus on all new financial loans above 6,000 euros with a maturity of one year or more 4 granted by any Spanish commercial or savings bank to legal persons every year during the time-period between December 1984 and December 2002.
The reason for concentrating only on financial loans, and excluding other debt operations such as commercial loans, leasing, factoring operations and off-balance sheet commitments is homogeneity and the belief that such loans are more suitable for relationship banking.
Nevertheless, financial loans are the bulk of loans to firms since they represent 60% of the total number of loans in the CIR.
Loans in the database are split into two groups: short-term (maturing at one to three years) and long-term (more than three years). As indicated above, this distinction is in order to have more homogenous operations within each of the two samples, taking into account the observed differences in the frequency with which collateral is used in each of the samples (8% and 50%, respectively). A second classification of the loans relates to the experience of the borrower. One group of loans, labelled "old", contains those loans from borrowers about whom, at the time the loan is granted, there is already past information in the CIR database.
The other group of loans, which we call "new", is from borrowers obtaining a loan for the first time.
Descriptive statistics of the variables
Descriptive information on the dependent and explanatory variables of the model of determinants of collateral is presented in Table 2 for "old" borrowers and in Table 3 for "new"
borrowers.
The average size of the loan in the short-term group is half the size of that in the long-term group, as might be expected bearing in mind that short-term loans can be renewed over time. The mean value of the variable DEBT, which proxies the size of the borrower, is also twice as large in the column of long-term loans as it is in the column of short-term ones, meaning that long-term loans are more frequent among large firms (borrowers) than among small firms. The ratio between the average size of the loan among long-term loans and among short-term loans is the same for old and new borrowers, although the average size of the loans among the former is three times the size of the latter. This means that new borrowers start to borrow with relatively small loans, probably because the firms in the group are smaller on average than the older ones or, perhaps, because the bank that grants the loan is more cautious. Besides, the standard deviation shows that the size of the loan is more homogeneous in the short term than in the long term and much more so for new borrowers than for old ones.
Larger banks tend to make more long-term loans than smaller ones, as the average size of banks among the group of long-term loans is larger than the average size among the short-term ones. The average lender to new borrowers is smaller than the average lender to old borrowers, probably because, in general, small (new) firms tend to do more business with small banks while large firms do business with larger customers [Berger and Udell (1995) , and Peek and Rosengren (1996) ]. Commercial banks have a larger market share than savings 4. In this large database there is not a code for each loan. Thus, it becomes difficult to track a loan over time. Since we wish to know the precise year when the loan is granted, the sample finally selected has been limited to those loans for which it was possible to estimate the year when it was made. Loans maturing at less than one year have been excluded because it is impossible to know whether they are new or an extension of a loan made in the past.
banks in short-term loans, among both old and new borrowers. The market share of savings banks is higher among new borrowers than among old ones. The proportion of borrowers that have a loan in default at the time they obtain a new loan, DEFAULT l,t-1 , is between 3 and 4% for old borrowers. Among those borrowers who are not in default when they obtain a short-term loan, 10% have defaulted in the following year;
this percentage is 7% for longer-term loans. Among new borrowers, 17% of those with a short-term loan will have defaulted in the following year after receiving the loan, while the percentage of defaulted loans in t+1 among the new borrowers with a long-term loan is 9%.
New borrowers with short-term loans have higher ex post credit risk than old borrowers with loans of the same maturity, although within the long-term loans the credit risks are the same for both groups 5 .
Methodology
The hypothesis about the determinants of the use of collateral in financial loans will be tested from the econometric estimation of a Probit model, which explains the dependent variable COLLATERAL as a function of the explanatory variables included in the model. The estimation will follow the "two-stage conditional maximum likelihood" (2SCML) procedure, developed by Rivers and Vuong (1988) , to take into account the fact that the SIZE of the loan variable can be endogenous, i.e. jointly determined with the decision to ask for collateral. 5. It may be of interest to compare some of these descriptive statistics with those presented by Berger and Udell (1995) for the US, and by Harhoff and Körting (1998) for Germany, keeping in mind that they work with credit-line data. In the US sample 53% of the loans have collateral while in the German sample the proportion is 62.4%. In the US sample borrowers have been with the bank from which they obtain the line of credit 78% of the time since they first engaged in their activity (11.4 years of Duration and 14.1 years of Age), while for the German sample the percentage is 70% (12 and 17.5 years). In our sample the age of the borrowers is counted as from the time each one obtains the first loan (on appearing in the Credit Register for the first time), and the ratio of loyalty to the lender is 52% (2.95 and 5.66 years). Finally, almost 30% of the firms in the German sample had been in financial distress during the past 5 years (3% of our firms had a loan in default the year before they obtained a new one), while the average number of lenders they have relations with is 1.82 (3.94 in our sample). The German and US samples consider only small firms, while we have the population of Spanish firms as well as the whole population of financial loans. 6. We have performed the estimations using other instruments, such as DEBTl,t-1, and the main results do not change. The estimation of the Probit model is repeated, following the procedure described above, for short-term and long-term loans, and for the two sub-samples of old and new borrowers.
The econometric procedure used to introduce borrowers' fixed effects into the empirical model is described in Greene (1993) . The procedure is based on a conditional likelihood approach implemented in a Logit model where it is possible to find a sufficient statistic for the fixed effect, and after conditioning on it, the result obtained has similar properties to those obtained differentiating the data in conventional time and cross-section data panels. Therefore, the model to be estimated in this section is:
where η l denotes the borrower-specific effect.
The Logit model with firm-specific effects works in samples where each individual has at least a zero (the borrower obtains a loan without collateral) and a one (the loan is with collateral). This substantially limits the sample of observations since only 25,199 (72,370) borrowers and 126,377 (357,527) loans satisfy this condition in the group of short-(long-) term loans. Therefore, the sample size in the group of old borrowers is one-quarter of the original one and the method can not be applied to new borrowers. Moreover, the new sample is biased towards larger firms, especially among the short-term loans, because the descriptive statistics (not reported) show that DEBTl,t-1 and SIZE of the loan are up to five times larger in the restricted sample than in the population of loans. In the reduced sample the proportion of short-term loans with collateral is 29.7%, compared with 8.5% in the population, but in the group of long-term loans the proportion of loans with collateral is similar in the two samples 8 .
The model that tests the predictions on the amount of collateral, partial or total, will be a Multinomial Logit, where the dependent variable can be in one of three categories: no collateral, partial collateral (i.e. more than 50% of the loan is secured) and total collateral (i.e. 100% secured) 9 .
The variables DEBT, "AGE" AS BORROWER, DURATION, SCOPE, NUMBER OF LENDERS and SIZE OF THE LOAN will enter into the models in natural logs because we expect decreasing marginal effects on the impact of each of them in the probability of use of collateral in a particular loan.
7. Since, in our case, the number of endogenous variables is one, the LR test and the significance of the error term of the loan size are equivalent, so we will refer to both indistinctly. 8. The use of fixed borrowers' effects in this paper can also be justified because no information is available about age of the borrower and about accounting statements. Harhoff and Körting (1998) find that accounting data do not have explanatory power in the decision to use collateral in their sample of German firms. 9. When one or more of the explanatory variables are endogenous, as SIZE of the loan in our case, the most appropriate model to use is the Probit model. The use of the Multinomial Logit model in this case is taken as an approximation. Empirical Results Tables 4 and 5 (Table 5) , a distinction is also made between short-and long-term loans but the control for fixed effects does not apply. 10. Not controlling for the endogeneity problem, the coefficient of the SIZE of the loan variable in the group of long-term loans would be higher than the value obtained with the correction, while in the group of short-term loans the correct parameter would have been underestimated. 11. The statistical tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables DEFAULT l,t-1 and DEFAULT l,t-1 are equal is rejected at p-values of zero [χ 2 (1) = 825.22 for long-term and χ 2 (1) = 275.84 for the short-term ones]. 12. This sum of coefficients is statistically zero with a related p-value of 0.14 [χ 2 (1) = 2.16]. This is always the case for short-term loans, for instance the p-value for the fixed-effects model is 0.24 and for new borrowers it increases to 0.26. 13. For instance, for the Logit model with fixed effects the LR test follows a χ 2 (2) and takes the value 58.14 for long-term loans, which is larger than the critical value of 5.99. For short-term loans this value is 36.04. variables or cross-effects are both positive. Therefore, for the group of borrowers with a loan in default at the time they obtain a new loan, the effect of duration in the likelihood of obtaining a loan is positive when DEFAULT l,t-1 = 1 then the coefficient of duration equals 0.105 (-0.174 + 0.279). Moreover, the effect of DURATION in the likelihood of collateral is lower, in absolute terms, in more concentrated credit markets than in less concentrated ones (the coefficient of DURATION is -0.174 + 0.005·HERFIDAHL).
The Use of Collateral
The results from the Logit model with fixed effects are presented in the last two columns of the Table 4 , for long-term loans, and Table 4 (Cont'd), for short-term loans. As might be expected, the comparison with the results from the Probit, no fixed effects, reveals that to control for borrowers unobserved heterogeneity affects mostly the coefficients of the variables that capture attributes of the borrower, such as relationship lending, amount of debt and years in the database. In the group of long-term loans the variables SCOPE and NUMBER OF LENDERS now have a negative and a positive sign (the opposite sign they have in the first two columns). DEBT now has a negative and significant coefficient and the coefficient of AGE is no longer statistically significant. For the rest of the variables the pattern of results remains unchanged, including those that capture the cross-effects.
In the group of short-term loans, the salient result is that fixed effects make the coefficients of DURATION and AGE AS BORROWER into non-statistically significant, while the coefficient of HERFINDAHL is now negative and significant. Further, SCOPE has a positive coefficient and NUMBER OF LENDERS a negative one, exactly the opposite signs of the coefficients of this variable in long term loans with fixed effects.
NEW BORROWERS
The pattern of results on the determinants of collateral for the sample of borrowers obtaining a loan for the first time, i.e. new borrowers, is quite similar to that observed among old borrowers for the shared variables (Table 5) collateral in loans made to borrowers that do not default a loan in t+1. In the group of new borrowers the difference in the likelihood of collateral in a loan made to borrowers that default in t+1, compared with the likelihood of collateral in a loan made to borrowers that do not default is around 2.4% for both short-term and long-term loans, lower than the respective increases among old borrowers.
One where GDP grows at a rate above the long-term trend, then loans made to old borrowers marginally reduce the probability of using collateral, additionally, by one percentage point in the case of long-term loans and 1.7 points if the loan is short-term. The reduction in the likelihood of collateral due to marginal increases in the real interest rate has a range of between 1.1% in short-term loans to old borrowers to 0.2% in long-term loans made to new borrowers.
Amount of collateral
The results of the Multinomial Logit model on the determinants of the amount of collateral (no collateral at all, partial collateral, and 100% collateral) in loans to old borrowers, are presented in Table 7 . The two columns of Table 7 show the estimated values, standard deviations and levels of significance for the differences between the coefficients of the Multinomial Logit that explains the likelihood of the collateral covering 100% of the face value of the loan, and the model of the likelihood of the loan being only partially covered by the collateral. A positive value indicates that an increase in the corresponding variable increases the likelihood of full collateral more than it does that of partial collateral. The estimated values for the differences in coefficients of the variable REAL INTEREST RATE are both positive, in short-term and in long-term loans, and statistically significant. For the SIZE variable of the loan, the other variable for which theoretical predictions exist, the estimated values of the differences between coefficients are both negative and also statistically significant.
Robustness of the results
The basic model (old borrowers and long-term loans) has been estimated with a different combination of explanatory variables to evaluate possible bias due to correlations among these variables and due to the fact that variables of relationship lending may not be totally exogenous. The results confirm the relevance of the control variables as determinants of the use of collateral since, in the case of long-term loans, the pseudo R 2 of the model with control variables alone is 0.16. They also show that the number of lenders is highly correlated with variables such as age as borrower and total debt at the time of the loan. The coefficients of these latter two variables are negative and significant when the number of lenders and fixed borrowers' effects are excluded from the model. When the number of lenders is one of the explanatory variables, the coefficient of debt is no longer significant and the coefficient of age as borrower decreases 74% (in absolute terms). The rest of the results are robust to all different specifications.
Since the sample size for the estimation of the Logit model with fixed effects in the group of short-term loans is smaller and biased towards larger borrowers in comparison with the population of short-term loans, the Probit model with no fixed effects is estimated for this reduced sample to ensure that the differences in the results of the model with and without fixed effects are in fact due to the control for unobserved heterogeneity. The results obtained with the population of short-term loans and with the reduced sample, in both cases without fixed effects, are very similar, confirming that the key factor for the observed changes in the results of Table 4 (cont'd), with and without fixed effects, is due to this new control variable and not to differences in the sample of observations.
As indicated above, computation of the marginal effects in the Logit model with fixed effects has to be done assuming an arbitrary value for the intercept of the Logit function. The results of Table 6 are obtained assuming a value of zero for all borrowers. To ensure that the choice of the intercept does not affect the results of Table 6 
Discussion
The evidence of this paper is in line with the findings of previous papers since our exogenous variables of ex ante and ex post credit risk of the borrower are both positively associated with the use of collateral. But the fact that the association between use of collateral and credit risk of the borrower varies in a predictable way, across situations that can be associated with more or less opportunities to use collateral as a signal of quality, suggests that the proper way to interpret the evidence is that in credit markets some loans are granted under conditions of observed risk and others under asymmetric information.
According to the empirical analysis presented in this paper (Table 6 ), for those borrowers that are known as low-quality borrowers when they apply for a new short-term loan (identified by the value of DEFAULT l,t-1 = 1), the probability that the loan will be granted with collateral is 46.9% (13.9/29.7) greater than if the same loan was granted to a borrower with no loan in default. If the loan is long-term the likelihood of collateral for those with loans in default is 20.6% (10.4/50.25) higher than for borrowers that pay their loans on time.
Among those borrowers that have a loan in default a year after obtaining the current loan and that were current in their payments at the time the loan was made (identified by the variable DEFAULT l,t+1 ), the likelihood that the short-term loan they receive will be with collateral is 24.5% higher (7.3/29.7) than the likelihood of collateral in short-term loans to borrowers that continue their loan payments on time. If the loan is long-term, the increase in the likelihood of the use of collateral is 8.2% (4.1/50.25). The same exercise in the group of firms that borrow a loan for the first time reveals that those borrowers that have a loan in default a year later have a 28.7% (3.9%) higher probability of having used collateral in their first short-term (long-term) loan than a borrower that is not in default.
The highest increase in the probability of use of collateral is for borrowers whose low credit quality is public knowledge, and therefore there is no point in using collateral to signal quality. The second highest increase in probability corresponds to old borrowers that are not in default when they apply for and obtain a loan; for them the system will have a record of decisions and performance, for example accounting statements, that can be used to estimate their credit quality, but there are also opportunities to use collateral to signal high quality.
Finally, the lowest increase in probability is for new borrowers, the group for which the signalling opportunities are higher. We interpret this pattern of results as evidence that, in the credit market, loans are made in a variety of information conditions and the results we observe in models of determinants of collateral such as that presented in this paper, are simply the net balance of loans in which collateral responds to situations of observed risk of the borrowers and loans in which collateral is used to signal quality.
Since the use of collateral is positively associated with risk ex post, a question of interest is to translate the ex ante observed presence of collateral in a loan into a conditioned probability of default. In other words, we are interested in the conditional probability that a borrower that obtains a loan with collateral today will have a loan in default in the next period.
The conditional probabilities defined this way, together with the marginal probability of default from sample frequencies, are presented in Table 8 . Higher differences between conditional and marginal probabilities imply higher information content of the signal use of collateral in the loan, as a predictor of credit risk. The results indicate that among short-term loans to old borrowers, to know that a loan is granted with collateral increases the likelihood that the borrower will default in t+1 by 5.1%, compared with the likelihood estimated from the sample frequency (15.03-9.96), namely a 51% increase. If the loan is long-term the information of the signal is much lower since the conditional probability is only 10% higher than that obtained from the sample frequency. Among new borrowers the pattern of changes is maintained but the differences between conditional and marginal probabilities are lower than in the sample of old borrowers: 39% in short-term loans and 4% in long-term loans.
Therefore, even though the use of collateral is a signal of a low-quality borrower, the information content of the signal is substantially higher in short-term loans than in long-term ones and among older borrowers than among new borrowers. This evidence is consistent with previous evidence about the association between collateral and credit risk: collateral is less informative about the risk of the borrower in situations where the number of borrowers that use collateral as a signal of quality is expected to be higher.
We Competition in the credit market affects the likelihood of collateral in loans, but the estimated economic significance of the effect is low in loans to old borrowers and null in loans to new borrowers. In Table 6 a marginal increase in the market concentration (one percentage point more) lowers the likelihood of collateral by 1.3% in short-term loans and by 0.3% in long-term loans. Nevertheless, the existing evidence would be consistent with theoretical results that predict more investment in production of information and softer loan terms in a less competitive credit market. But the paper goes a step further and compares the effect of the duration variable on the likelihood of collateral in credit markets of different concentration.
The results show that the effect of duration on the likelihood of collateral is lower in more concentrated credit markets, which contradicts the hypothesis that less competition (more concentration) increases the value of specific borrower information. The evidence would be more in line with Boot and Thakor (2000) , who predict more incentives for banks to offer differentiated services to their customers as competition increases.
The characteristics of the lender are shown to have significant relevance for the likelihood of the use of collateral in loans. A short-term loan to old (new) borrowers is 38.4%
(16.1%) less likely to be with collateral if it is made by a commercial bank than if the lender is a savings bank. In long-term loans the reduction in the likelihood of collateral if the lender is a commercial bank is 17.3% (5.7%). Larger banks are also less likely to ask for collateral in the loans they make than small banks. The difference is economically significant since a marginal increase in the size of the bank (one thousand euros more) reduces the likelihood of collateral by between 3.6% in short-term loans to old borrowers and 0.7% in long-term loans. Taking into account that specialisation of the lender in loans to business firms also lowers the likelihood of collateral, the evidence is interpreted in the sense that banks with higher expertise and with more resources to evaluate loan applications are less inclined to use collateral as a substitute for a thorough evaluation of the loan application Finally, the tests of the predictions by Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) that the amount of collateral pledged in a particular loan will increase if the loan is made in a period of higher real interest rates, and will be lower in larger than in smaller loans, confirm the theoretical results. This evidence could confirm that moral hazard problems condition the use of collateral in loans. The model recommends increasing the amount of collateral, instead of charging higher interest on the loan, in situations where to increase the interest on the loan with a risk premium when the risk-free interest rate is already high would worsen the moral hazard situation created after the loan is received.
15. Berger (2004) interprets the fact that larger banks tend to lend more often without collateral as evidence that they specialise in transactional lending to relatively safe and transparent firms. even when this quality is revealed after the loan is made (and borrowers had the opportunity to use collateral to signal high quality). However, the evidence indicates that the likelihood of collateral among those that reveal ex post as low quality is lower in the group of inexperienced, young borrowers, those with more opportunities to get a loan under private information, than among old and experienced ones. This evidence provides preliminary empirical support of the theories that explain collateral as a solution to adverse selection problems [Bester (1985) , and Besanko and Thakor (1987a) ]. Therefore the final conclusion has to be that the fact that collateral increases with credit risk of the borrower is a net effect of higher proportion of loans made under observed risk than under private information.
We also find support for the hypothesis of better sorting of borrowers in low and high quality as explanation of the negative effect of duration of the borrower-lender relationship in the likelihood of using collateral [Berger and Udell (1995) ], instead of the trust explanation given by Boot and Thakor (1994) . Moreover, the use of collateral is less likely in more The empirical analysis of collateral presented in this paper opens new lines of research into the determinants of collateral to explain the regularities observed in the effect of macroeconomic conditions on the decision to use collateral. We find that a decrease in the GDP growth rate increases the likelihood of loans being made with collateral and, also, that this effect is asymmetric in the sense that the likelihood of collateral diminishes proportionally more when the economy is above its long-term trend than it increases when the actual growth is less than its average. The effect of the business cycle on loan conditions seems to be stronger in loans to new borrowers entering the system for the first time, than in loans to established borrowers, while general economic conditions tend to trigger earlier responses in long-term loans than in short-term ones. The real interest rate of the economy affects the decision to use collateral in a different way than the decision over its amount, with a negative effect arising in the first case and a positive one in the second. 
Variables Definition

Borrower's Risk
Default t-1 1 if the borrower has defaulted on a loan at any time in previous year, 0 otherwise Default t+1 1 if the loan default is in the first year but not in t-1, 0 otherwise
Competition
Herfindahl t Sum of squared market shares of the lenders in the loan market of the province (%)
Relationship lending
Duration t -1 Number of years since the borrower had the first loan with the lender at the beginning of the period Scope t -1
Number of loan operations with the lender at the beginning of the period Number of lenders t -1
Number of lenders with which the borrower has relations at the beginning of the period
Experience and preferences of lender
Size of the lender t Assets of the lender relative to the total assets of the system (%) Bank 1 if the lender is a commercial bank, 0 otherwise Specialisation t
Percentage of loans to firms by the lender (%)
Control Variables Economic conditions
GDP growth t-1 Growth of the GDP in the year prior to which the loan is made (%) |GDPG t-1 -Average GDPG t-1 | Absolute difference between GDP growth in t-1and average GDP growth in t-1 in the sample (%) Real interest rate t 3-month interbank interest rate minus rate of change in CPI in the year of the loan (%) Geographic risk t-1
Proportion of bad loans in the province of the borrower at the beginning of the period (%) Product Market risk t-1
Proportion of bad loans in the economic sector of the borrower at the beginning of the period (%) Table 5 Determinants of collateral: New Borrowers
Results of the estimation of the determinants of the probability that a loan in year t will have collateral given the Risk of the Borrower, the Concentration in the Geographic Market, and the Macroeconomic environment and the Size of the loan as control variables, for the group of New Borrowers. Probit model estimated by 2SCML. For the definition of the variables, see Table 1 .
Notes:
a. Each regression also includes 49 regional dummies and 10 industry dummies. The estimations obtained using the 2SCML methodology, have to be multiplied by the term b. * * * associated variable significant at 1%, * * at 5%, and * at 10%. 1.000 0.969 Table 6 Marginal effects
New Borrowers
Marginal changes in the probability of using collateral in a financial loan in the groups of Old b. * * * associated variable significant at 1%, * * at 5%, and * at 10%. Table 7 Determinants of the amount of collateral: Old Borrowers
Results of the estimation of the determinants of the amount of collateral for a loan in year t given the Risk of the Borrower, the Concentration in the Geographic Market, the Relationship between the lender and the borrower, and the Macroeconomic environment, the Characteristics of the Lender and the Size of the loan as control variables for the group of Old Borrowers. Multinomial Logit model. For the definition of the variables, see Table 1 .
Notes:
a. Each regression also includes 49 regional dummies and 10 industry dummies. The estimations obtained using the 2SCML methodology, have to be multiplied by the term b. * * * associated variable significant at 1%, * * at 5%, and * at 10%. Table 8 Predicted probabilities of Default in t+1
Conditional probability (%) that the borrower will default in period t+1 given that the loan granted in period t-1 had collateral Note: For example, the figure of 15.03% is obtained as follows. The Pr(Collateral/Default t+1 ) is obtained from the date with all other variables at their sample means and is equal to 11.47%.
The marginal probability of default is Pr(Default t+1 )=9.96%. Therefore the joint probability of
Collateral and Default will be Pr(Collateral and Default)= 1.14%. Since the marginal probability of Collateral is, for the variables at their sample means, Pr(Collateral)=7.60%, the conditional probability of Default given Collateral is equal to Pr(Default t+1 /Collateral)=1.14/7.60=0.1503.
Long Term Short Term
Long Term Short Term Average Probability of Defualt in t+1 for the population (from Tables 2 and 3) 7.32 9.96 9.12 17.37
Conditional Probability of Default in t+1 given that the Loan is Collateralised 8.03 15.03 9.46 24.09
Old Borrowers New Borrowers
